The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen's Welfare When the Processing Sector Is Imperfectly Competitive
研究在加工部门不完全竞争下，开放捕捞渔业转向个人可转让配额（ITQ）管理后渔民的福利变化，发现完全竞争下渔民获益，但加工部门不完全竞争时可能遭受福利损失。
In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery after it transitions to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power in the harvesting sector on ITQ performance, none has considered the implications of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. Addressing this question, we find that although fishermen should expect to gain from ITQs under perfect competition, they may suffer welfare losses if the processing sector is imperfectly competitive. <i></i>