Mixed signals: A dynamic analysis of warranty provision in the automotive industry, 1960–2008
研究指出传统信号研究用静态数据可能违反信号理论的均衡前提，通过分析1960-2008年美国汽车制造商保修数据，发现均衡与非均衡时期信号行为不同，影响信号准确性。
Often, signaling research in the strategy and economics literature postulates the existence of an ostensible signal and then empirically tests its veracity, utilizing cross‐sectional data. We argue that this static approach does not allow researchers to fully incorporate the concept of equilibrium in their analysis, thereby potentially violating a key axiom of signaling theory. We propose that a dynamic analysis of signals can address this omission, and then conduct such an analysis. We use empirical data on warranty coverage offered by automobile manufacturers in the U.S . market extending from the first warranty offered by the industry in 1960 through to 2008. Our findings support the notion that signaling behavior differs in periods of equilibrium and disequilibrium, in turn influencing signal accuracy . Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.