LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH REHIRING
分析了一个分离并非永久性的劳动力市场，其中重新激活的企业更倾向于再雇佣前员工而非招聘新人，并研究了企业承诺再雇佣工资时的均衡结果。
Consistent with the empirical evidence, this article analyzes a labor market in which separations are not permanent and reactivated firms prefer to rehire former employees instead of seek new ones. Workers engage in job search due to the uncertain prospects of rehiring. If firms can commit to wages contingent on rehiring, they backload wages to provide incentives for workers to reduce their unobservable search effort. Under risk aversion and incomplete markets, if productivity at reactivation is sufficiently high, the tension between wage backloading and consumption smoothing leads to excessive search in equilibrium.