A Proximate Mirror: Greenhouse Gas Rules and Strategic Behavior Under the US Clean Air Act
研究了美国各州在电力行业温室气体排放标准设计上的差异如何导致策略性行为，包括发电和投资的跨州转移，并探讨了避免这种掠夺性行为的政策选项。
The development of climate policy in the United States mirrors international developments, with efforts to initiate a coordinated approach giving way to jurisdictions separately taking actions. The centerpiece of US policy is regulation in the electricity sector that identifies a carbon emissions rate standard (intensity standard) for each state but leaves to states the design of policies, including potentially the use of technology policies, emissions rate averaging, or cap and trade. Differences in policies among states within the same power market could promote predatory behavior resulting in a geographic shift in generation and investment in new resources. This paper examines the coordination problem using a detailed partial equilibrium model of operations and investment. We demonstrate that leading jurisdictions have available a rich set of design options including targetted output based allocation that would impose costs on neighbors and may protect against strategic predation.