Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy
构建了一个有组织犯罪的代理模型，分析同案证人制度的最优政策及其决定因素，并用意大利1991年引入该制度前后的数据检验了理论预测，发现该制度增强了威慑和起诉效果，且其有效性受司法效率影响。
Abstract We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade‐offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice‐witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice‐witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.