The Response of Worker Effort to Piece Rates
利用美国中西部伐木业的公司级工资数据，估计工人对计件工资变化的努力弹性，发现弹性在0.413到1.507之间，验证了现有模型的适用性。
Abstract Using firm-level payroll data from the Midwest logging industry, I compute a worker’s productivity response to a change in piece-rate pay, an elasticity of effort, using an empirical specification developed in Paarsch and Shearer (1999). Maximum-likelihood estimation of an agency-based structural econometric model of worker choice yields elasticities ranging from 0.413 to 1.507. These estimates are smaller than, but qualitatively similar to, those reported in Paarsch and Shearer, suggesting that their model has perhaps more general applicability than their British Columbia tree-planting example.