Temporary Disability and Economic Incentives
利用挪威临时残疾保险制度的全面改革作为准实验，发现福利水平和当地劳动力需求显著影响领取者的劳动供给，福利水平对就业转换率的弹性为-0.33。
We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi‐experiment taking place in Norway, involving a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labour supply of TDI claimants does respond to both the benefit level and the level of local labour demand. The estimated elasticity of the transition rate to employment with respect to the benefit level is −0.33. We also find that the TDI benefit level significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programmes.