When do Non‐FamilyCEOs Outperform in Family Firms? Agency and Behavioural Agency Perspectives
基于代理理论与行为代理理论，研究意大利893家家族企业发现，非家族CEO在受到多个主要家族所有者监督且不与家族成员联合CEO共享权力时，表现更优。
Abstract Family firms represent a globally dominant form of organization, yet they confront a steep challenge of finding and managing competent leaders. Sometimes, these leaders cannot be found within the owning family. To date we know little about the governance contexts under which non‐family leaders thrive or founder. Guided by concepts from agency theory and behavioural agency theory, we examine the conditions of ownership and leadership that promote superior performance among non‐family CEO s of family firms. Our analysis of 893 Italian family firms demonstrates that these leaders outperform when they are monitored by multiple major family owners as opposed to a single owner; they also outperform when they are not required to share power with co‐ CEO s who are family members, and who may be motivated by parochial family socioemotional priorities.