How to Pay Envious Managers – a Theoretical Analysis
分析了嫉妒如何影响竞争经理人的决策，发现嫉妒能成为强大的激励，使经理人表现优于自利者，且股东无需给予股票薪酬。
Abstract This paper analyses how envy affects the decisions of competing managers and their optimal stock‐based compensation from the perspective of shareholder value. We consider a typical framework in which managers can induce effort to reduce production costs and make decisions regarding production volume. At first glance, envy between managers from competing firms appears to be an unfavorable characteristic because it does not align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. However, our model finds that envy is a powerful incentive mechanism. The model yields three key findings: (i) envious managers outperform self‐interested managers, (ii) firms optimally hire envious managers, and (iii) shareholders do not grant any stock‐based compensation to envious managers.