Online Shopping and Platform Design with Ex Ante Registration Requirements
研究在线市场中，企业要求消费者在了解产品信息前注册（因隐私安全顾虑）的盈利条件，发现垄断卖家可从中获益，且折扣能影响注册决策，在价格竞争下仍成立。
We study platform design in online markets in which buying involves a (nonmonetary) cost for consumers caused by privacy and security concerns. Firms decide whether to require registration at their website before consumers learn relevant product information. We derive conditions under which a monopoly seller benefits from ex ante registration requirements and demonstrate that the profitability of registration requirements is increased when taking into account the prospect of future purchases or an informational value of consumer registration to the firm. Moreover, we consider the effectiveness of discounts (store credit) as a means to influence the consumers’ registration decision. Finally, we confirm the profitability of ex ante registration requirements in the presence of price competition. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2595 . This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.