Union Power, Replacement and Labour Market Dynamics
构建了新的内部人-外部人理论，指出内部人更容易组织并委托谈判，解释了工会导致过度就业而非失业的倾向，并表明工会合同看似引发就业不足实则提高招聘效率。
In this paper, we construct a new basis for insider–outsider theory that acknowledges that insiders are typically easier to organise, so that they can delegate their bargaining decisions to a representative if they want to. We show that harassment or discrimination of new workers by the insider work force is neither individually rational nor needed to explain union formation or inefficient hiring decisions. However, we show that there is a strong tendency for overemployment. Unions tend to increase the efficiency of hiring decisions although union contracts will look like inducing underemployment.