LICENSE AUCTIONS WHEN WINNING BIDS ARE FINANCED THROUGH DEBT*
研究两个新市场牌照拍卖中，中标者通过债务融资对拍卖收入、零售价格和公司利润的影响，发现债务会改变产品市场竞争强度，导致价格和收入变化。
We study an auction where two licenses to operate on a new market are sold and winning bidders finance their bids on the debt market. Higher bids imply higher debts which affects product market competition. When debt induces firms to compete more aggressively, retail prices are lower than in a model without debt, as are auction revenues. When debt induces firms to compete less aggressively, retail prices are higher than in a model without debt, and the effect on auction revenues is ambiguous. Net firm profits are always higher than in a model without debt due to endogenous credit rationing.