Public Provision of Private Goods, Self‐Selection, and Income Tax Avoidance
研究了公共提供工作互补品如何影响人们通过降低劳动供给来减少应税收入的行为，并发现避税行为（此前被忽视）会改变公共提供的结论，因为避税打破了劳动供给与报告收入之间的关联。
Abstract Redistributive taxation should benefit those with low earnings capacity rather than those who choose a lower income to obtain tax savings. Several contributions have highlighted how public provision of work complements can discourage people from lowering labor supply to diminish taxable income. We show how tax avoidance, previously neglected, can alter the conclusions regarding public provision. Tax avoidance breaks the link between labor supply and reported income. An agent reducing his reported income to escape taxes might no longer forego a publicly provided labor complement, because he can now lower his income by avoiding more rather than working less.