动态贡献博弈的可实现结果

Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games

Theoretical Economics · 2013
被引 30
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

研究了多阶段博弈中玩家随时间增加行动水平以提升他人未来收益的情形,推导了可实现行动配置的必要条件,并发现当贴现且周期极短时,可实现配置集与移动结构无关,有效配置近似可实现当且仅当它在核心中。

Abstract

This paper concerns multistage games, with and without discounting, in which each player can increase the level of an action over time so as to increase the other players' future payoffs. An action profile is said to be achievable if it is the limit point of a subgame perfect equilibrium path. Necessary conditions are derived for achievability under relatively general conditions. They imply that any efficient profile that is approximately achievable must be in the core of the underlying coalitional game. In some but not all games with discounting, the necessary conditions for achievability are also sufficient for a profile to be the limit of achievable profiles as the period length shrinks to zero. Consequently, in these games when the period length is very short, (i) the set of achievable profiles does not depend on the move structure; (ii) an efficient profile can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core; and (iii) any achievable profile can be achieved almost instantly.

动态贡献博弈可实现结果子博弈完美均衡核心