Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms
研究纵向一体化企业与未一体化下游企业之间的两级竞争，发现即使一体化企业在同质投入品上价格竞争，也可能出现高于边际成本的局部封锁均衡，且下游竞争越激烈或未一体化企业效率越低时越可能发生。
We propose a model of two‐tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the B ertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient. We discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market.