Bank Competition and Financial Stability: Evidence from the Financial Crisis
利用金融危机数据，发现银行竞争越弱，银行越容易从事高风险活动、被监管干预和倒闭，且所在州房贷批准率更高、房价泡沫更大、危机中跌幅更猛，表明竞争增强稳定性。
Abstract We examine the link between bank competition and financial stability using the recent financial crisis as the setting. We utilize variation in banking competition at the state level and find that banks facing less competition are more likely to engage in risky activities, more likely to face regulatory intervention, and more likely to fail. Focusing on the real estate market, we find that states with less competition had higher rates of mortgage approval, experienced greater inflation in housing prices before the crisis, and experienced a steeper decline in housing prices during the crisis. Overall, our study is consistent with greater competition increasing financial stability.