Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment
通过一个动态理论模型和田野实验，研究了可再生资源开采中的合作问题，发现经验丰富的渔民行为符合纳什均衡，即资源被迅速耗尽。
We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.