Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction
提出一种基于竞赛的简单机制，通过自愿参与和个体理性激励，在不影响生产效率的前提下将有害排放降至高效水平，并探讨了随机产出版本中转移支付如何为国际环境协议的形成提供互保动机。
Abstract We propose a simple contest‐based mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infringing upon productive efficiency. Participation in the most stylized form of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational; all rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed. The scheme balances its budget and requires no principal. In a perhaps more realistic stochastic output version, which could potentially inform policy decisions, we show that the transfers required by the efficient mechanism create a mutual insurance motive that can serve as an effective rationale for the (gradual) formation of international environmental agreements.