Managerial Performance Evaluation and Real Options
研究了在需求随机变化的环境中，如何设计基于权责发生制的绩效指标，使管理者在拥有私人信息时做出有效投资和运营决策，并分析了闲置产能期权对会计规则的影响。
ABSTRACT In a dynamic setting with demand following a random process, we ask how investment and operating decisions can be delegated to a manager with unknown time preferences. Only the manager observes the demand realization in each period and, therefore, has private information when choosing whether to acquire the productive asset and, subsequently, how to utilize it. We derive accrual accounting-based performance measures under which the manager will make the efficient decisions provided the investment date is exogenously given. We show that in an environment where demand follows a martingale process, the corresponding accounting rules are more decelerated if the firm has the option to idle capacity in case of negative demand shocks. We then describe the limitations of accounting-based performance measures in a scenario where the investment date is endogenously determined, i.e., the firm has an option to wait.