Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
在Rothschild-Stiglitz竞争保险模型的博弈论版本中，刻画了所有均衡，证明对称均衡唯一存在，并给出混合策略均衡的精确条件，涉及风险间交叉补贴、风险分布依赖和价格离散。
This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions under which the equilibrium involves mixed strategies are provided. The mixed equilibrium features (i) cross-subsidization across risk levels, (ii) dependence of offers on the risk distribution, and (iii) price dispersion generated by firm randomization over offers.