The Real Effects of Government‐Owned Banks: Evidence from an Emerging Market
利用巴西制造业企业数据，研究发现政府控制银行导致政治影响企业实际决策，临近选举时企业在政治有利地区扩大就业，并从政府银行获得更多贷款。
ABSTRACT Using plant‐level data for Brazilian manufacturing firms, this paper provides evidence that government control over banks leads to significant political influence over the real decisions of firms. I find that firms eligible for government bank lending expand employment in politically attractive regions near elections. These expansions are associated with additional (favorable) borrowing from government banks. Further, these persistent expansions take place just before competitive elections, and are associated with lower future employment growth by firms in other regions. The analysis suggests that politicians in Brazil use bank lending to shift employment towards politically attractive regions and away from unattractive regions.