谁在中国做假账,并且有回报?来自私营高科技企业的证据

Who cooks the books in China, and does it pay? Evidence from private, high‐technology firms

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL · 2015
被引 99
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究467家中国私营科技企业,发现超半数向不同政府机构提交的利润数据存在系统性差异;政治关联和风投支持的企业更可能造假,且造假企业获得创新资助的概率更高。

Abstract

Research summary: We document the extent of fraudulent reporting among 467 private Chinese technology companies. Comparing the financial statements concurrently submitted to two different state agencies, we demonstrate a systematic gap in reported profit figures in the two sets of books. We find: (1) more than half the sampled companies report incentive‐compatible, materially discrepant profit numbers to the two agencies; (2) politically connected companies are approximately 18 percent more likely to commit fraud and those with venture capital backing are 19 percent more likely to do so; and (3) it pays to cheat. We estimate that companies who “cook” their books have considerably higher odds of receiving an innovation grant. Especially given its prevalence, we conclude that fraud can be a source of performance differential for emerging market companies . Managerial summary: We document that more than half of a sample of 467 private, Chinese technology companies engage in fraudulent financial reporting. By comparing the financial statements companies concurrently submitted to two different state agencies, we demonstrate a systematic gap in reported profit figures in the two sets of books. Relative to the companies without these attributes, we find that politically connected companies are approximately 18 percent more likely to commit fraud and those with venture capital backing are 19 percent more likely to do so. Furthermore, we show that it pays to cheat. We estimate that companies who “cook” their books have considerably higher odds of receiving a government‐sponsored innovation grant. Therefore, fraud can be a source of performance differential for emerging market companies . Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

会计公司治理政治关联风险投资创新