Underwriting Fees and Shareholder Rights
研究发现，股东权利受限的公司更难获得外部股权融资，承销商会通过更积极的分析师推荐来促销其股票，并收取更高的承销费用。
Abstract Do firms’ governance provisions affect their terms of obtaining external financing? We hypothesize that it is more difficult for firms with more restrictions on shareholder rights to raise external equity, and that since analyst coverage is an important part of underwriting services, underwriters would use analyst recommendations to promote issuing firms with weaker shareholder rights more strongly and charge them higher underwriting fees. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that analyst recommendations on issuing firms with weak shareholder rights increase more than those with strong shareholder rights prior to SEOs, and that underwriting spreads are positively related to issuing firms’ shareholder rights as proxied by the G‐index. Furthermore, the effect of shareholder rights on underwriting fees is largely contained in the six provisions in the E‐index.