Motivation and Markets
在效率工资模型中引入基于主观评估的绩效工资，发现当职位空缺成本低且合格工人短缺时，绩效工资更有效；资本密集型行业工资更高；维持效率需要类似公平工资的社会惯例。
Many workers receive pay based on subjectively assessed performance, yet the shirking model of efficiency wages excludes it. This paper incorporates such pay, with the following results. Performance pay is more efficient than efficiency wages when the costs of having a job vacant are low and qualified workers in short supply. More capital-intensive industries pay more than less capital-intensive industries, as observed in studies of interindustry wages differentials. Sustaining an efficient outcome requires a social convention similar to the notion of a fair wage. The model also makes predictions about the relationship between turnover, wages, growth and unemployment.