Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability
通过美式竞拍游戏实验，发现认知能力对策略意识的影响是非线性的：低于某阈值的被试随机选数且不关心他人能力，而高于阈值的被试则避免选50以上并对他人的认知能力敏感。
Abstract We examine strategic awareness in experimental games, that is, the question of whether subjects realize they are playing a game and thus have to form beliefs about others’ actions. We conduct a beauty contest game and elicit measures of cognitive ability and beliefs about others’ cognitive ability. We show that the effect of cognitive ability is highly non-linear. Subjects below a certain threshold choose numbers in the whole interval and their behavior does not correlate with beliefs about others’ ability. In contrast, subjects who exceed the threshold avoid choices above 50 and react very sensitively to beliefs about the cognitive ability of others.