Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All
通过竞赛模型发现，对弱势群体给予优惠政策的福利效果取决于教育成本与供给：在美国（教育成本高但易获得）时福利改善，在印度（教育补贴多但供给有限）时福利降低，并解释了为何对相同个体区别对待可能提高福利。
This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working in favor of them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the United States), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.