Testing Theories of Agency Behavior: Evidence from Hydropower Project Relicensing Decisions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
研究通过分析联邦能源监管委员会对水电项目重新许可的决策，检验了代理行为理论，发现新法律和行政更迭对监管决策有显著影响。
<i>Theories of agency behavior are examined via an application to hydropower project relicensing by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In the relicensing of each project, fish and wildlife agencies submit recommendations to FERC. FERC then enters a two stage deliberation process for each recommendation. Econometric analysis of these decisions covers 933 recommendations made for 72 projects relicensed during 1980–96. A new law (the Electric Consumers Protection Act) substantially altered FERC’s decisions, while a new administration (the Clinton administration) exerted a mixed effect. Both events influenced the number of recommendations per project made by the fish and wildlife agencies.</i>