Disability Insurance and the Dynamics of the Incentive Insurance Trade-Off
构建生命周期框架评估残疾保险的保险与负激励效应，利用消费、健康、保险和工资数据估计风险与政策参数，发现放宽审核标准或提高福利水平虽恶化激励但提升福利，且无条件福利项目能改善残疾保险的瞄准效果。
We provide a life-cycle framework for comparing insurance and disincentive effects of disability benefits. The risks that individuals face and the parameters of the Disability Insurance (DI) program are estimated from consumption, health, disability insurance, and wage data. We characterize the effects of disability insurance and study how policy reforms impact behavior and welfare. DI features high rejection rates of disabled applicants and some acceptance of healthy applicants. Despite worse incentives, welfare increases as programs become less strict or generosity increases. Disability insurance interacts with welfare programs: making unconditional means-tested programs more generous improves disability insurance targeting and increases welfare.