Reputation Leaders, Quality Laggards: Incentive Structure in Markets with Both Private and Collective Reputations
构建理论模型分析兼具私人声誉和集体声誉的市场中企业投资质量的激励，用数值动态规划模拟企业策略并与区域规划者最优投资比较，揭示导致非对称或次优投资的市场与产品特征。
Abstract A theoretical model is developed to illustrate the economic incentives to invest in quality in markets with a dual reputation structure: private (firm reputation) and collective (regional reputation). Numerical dynamic programming techniques are then used to simulate firms’ strategic behaviour, and competitive outcomes are compared to the optimal investment of a regional planner. Market and product characteristics inducing asymmetric and/or sub‐optimal investment strategies, potentially destabilising for the region, are investigated.