Mutual Forbearance and Competition Among Security Analysts
研究证券分析师在覆盖多只股票时，因多点接触而产生的相互容忍现象，发现分析师在自己主导的股票上信息领导力更强，但预测准确性未显著提升，且公平披露规则加强了这种容忍。
Research in industrial organization and strategic management has shown that rivals competing with each other in multiple markets are more willing to show each other mutual forbearance, i.e., compete less aggressively, within their spheres of influence, i.e., the markets in which each firm dominates. Sell-side equity analysts typically cover multiple stocks in common with their rivals. We examine the impact of this “multipoint contact” for mutual forbearance on two key dimensions of competition among security analysts: forecast accuracy and information leadership (issuing earnings forecasts or stock recommendations that influence rival analysts). We find that multipoint contact is associated with analysts exerting greater information leadership on stocks within their own spheres of influence. We also find greater forbearance related to information leadership under Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). In contrast, multipoint contact was not associated with greater forecast accuracy on stocks within analysts’ spheres of influence, either before or under Reg FD. Our analysis is among the first to consider mechanisms of competition among securities analysts and also adds to the literature on Reg FD by demonstrating that the increased workload imposed on analysts after Reg FD fostered mutual forbearance as a response. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.