Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
定义了两玩家不完全信息博弈中的无信念均衡，即无论玩家对自然状态的信念如何，其后续策略都是最优反应。文章刻画了包含所有无信念均衡收益的集合，并证明该集合内部的任何收益都是无信念均衡收益，最后将这一刻画应用于声誉分析。
We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.