Optimisation and evolution: Winter's critique of Friedman revisited
重新审视弗里德曼的利润最大化假说与温特的批判，结合演化理论的最新发展，探讨理性或最大化行为在演化背景下的含义。
Milton Friedman's (1953) article remains an often-quoted defense of the maximization hypothesis but Sidney Winter's (1964) critique of Friedman is less well known. This paper examines critically both the natural selection argument invoked by Friedman and others and the main elements of Winter's critique in the light of recent development in evolutionary theory. Winter attempted to identify the circumstances in which the selection of maximizers could occur and these are elaborated critically. Finally, Winter's critique is extended by considering the very meaning of rational or maximizing behavior. It is argued that the answer to this is neither obvious nor straightforward in an evolutionary context. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.