Trading‐off Corporate Control and Personal Diversification through Capital Structure and Merger Activity
利用最大股东投资组合分散化的直接估计，研究股东分散化对公司的影响。对于个人控股公司，所有者管理者通过债务、双重股权和并购来权衡控制权与分散化不足；对于机构控股公司，控制权重要而分散化不重要。
Abstract: In this study we use direct estimates of the portfolio diversification of the largest shareholder in a firm to study the impact of shareholder diversification on the firm. For firms where the controlling shareholder is an individual, our tests indicate that the owner‐managers use debt, dual class shares and corporate control transactions (merger activity) to strategically trade off corporate control and the drawback of poor portfolio diversification. However, for firms where the controlling shareholder is an institution, our results indicate that control but not diversification is important.