Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting versus the ERM
修改Barro-Gordon模型，引入实际利率偏差与通胀偏差，分析通胀目标制与欧洲汇率机制在解决可信度与稳定权衡上的优劣，对研究货币政策设计的学者有参考价值。
First we modify the Barro-Gordon model so that a credibility-stabilization \n \ntrade-off will remain even when a performance contract of the type \n \nenvisaged by Walsh (1995) is imposed on the central bank governor. We do \n \nthis by modeling a real interest rate bias along with the inflation bias. \n \nThen we discuss how various inflation penalties might actually be imposed \n \non a central bank and ask whether "inflation targeting (supported by one or \n \nanother of the penalties) is likely to bring a better resolution to the \n \ncredibility-stabilization trade-off than the ERM.