A MODEL OF PATENT TROLLS
构建了一个专利流氓模型，分析非实施主体（NPE）如何利用早期诉讼结果的信息外部性，对多个相关技术使用者形成可信的诉讼威胁，并讨论了费用转移和禁令救济等政策含义。
Abstract This article develops a model of patent trolls to understand various litigation strategies employed by nonpracticing entities (NPEs). When an NPE faces multiple potential infringers who use related technologies, it can gain a credible threat to litigate even when it has no such credibility vis‐à‐vis any single potential infringer in isolation. This is due to an information externality generated by an early litigation outcome for subsequent litigation. Successful litigation creates an option value against future potential infringers through Bayesian updating. We discuss policy implications including legal fee shifting and the use of injunctive relief.