Clientelism in Indian Villages
研究印度马哈拉施特拉邦农村地方政府的运作，发现选举表面民主但背后存在根深蒂固的庇护主义投票交易结构，精英通过土地所有权和社会优势维持政治控制，阻碍有利于穷人的再分配政策。
We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms.