Soft Budget Constraints in Public Hospitals
研究了政府无法承诺不救助公立医院时，软预算约束如何导致医院在预算期内过度治疗择期患者、救助后治疗不足，并分析了私立医院的引入对救助规模和福利的影响。
A soft budget constraint arises when a government is unable to commit to not 'bailout' a public hospital if the public hospital exhausts its budget before the end of the budget period. It is shown that if the political costs of a 'bailout' are relatively small, then the public hospital exhausts the welfare-maximising budget before the end of the budget period and a 'bailout' occurs. In anticipation, the government offers a budget to the public hospital that may be greater than or less than the welfare-maximising budget. In either case, the public hospital treats 'too many' elective patients before the 'bailout' and 'too few' after. The introduction of a private hospital reduces the size of any 'bailout' and increases welfare.