Why Don't Present-Biased Agents Make Commitments?
定量探讨了为何现时偏向的个体很少做出承诺，通过扩展拖延模型发现，承诺的感知收益常被成本所压倒，因此承诺需求是特例而非普遍情况。
Present-biased preferences engender a demand for commitment. Commitment is a problematic prediction, since we see so little of it. I quantitatively explore the reasons for the “missing” commitment. Extending the procrastination model in Carroll et al. (2009), I show how equilibrium commitment is related to (i) the standard deviation of the opportunity cost of time, (ii) the cost of delay, (iii) the degree of partial naivete, and (iv) the direct cost of commitment. The calibrated model demonstrates that the perceived benefits of commitment are often overwhelmed by the costs of commitment. Demand for commitment is a special case rather than the general case.