The Climate Policy Hold‐Up: Green Technologies, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements
用一个简单模型揭示国际环境协议与知识产权制度之间的冲突：当知识产权保护强且全球化时，协议签署国担心创新者收取租金，导致减排量下降甚至低于非签署国，且签署国数量减少。探讨了尊重现有产权但避免策略互动的政策选项。
Abstract The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of “green” technologies. Using a simple model, we highlight a conflict between international environmental agreements (IEAs) on emissions reductions and international systems of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on abatement technologies. When IPRs are strong and global, IEA signatories anticipate rent extraction by innovators. This hold‐up effect reduces abatement, potentially to levels below those of non‐signatories, and it reduces the number of signatories to self‐enforcing IEAs. We explore policy options that respect existing property rights, but avoid the strategic interaction between signatories to an IEA and innovators.