Life Expectancy Heterogeneity and the Political Support for Collective Annuities
研究了不同生产率和寿命预期的个体如何投票决定集体年金的规模和类型，发现寿命与生产率相关性越高或平均寿命越长，集体年金越偏向全民普享型，但规模可能缩小。
Abstract Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non‐contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.