Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform
运用谈判动态、行政政治和代理理论，研究新西兰土地改革的财务结果，发现政府向承租人让步，原因可能是官僚应对或中间人加剧了委托代理问题。
This paper uses bargaining dynamics, administrative politics, and agency theory to examine financial outcomes from New Zealand land reform. Results are inconsistent with payments arising from a bargain in which both the Crown and lessee advocate to their full potential, and are instead consistent with the Crown backing down to lessees’ desires for a generous deal. This back-down stems either from “bureaucratic coping,” or from the addition of a bureaucratic middleman between the Crown principal and its negotiator subagent, exacerbating the principal-agent problem. <i></i>