Keynesian uncertainty and liquidity preference
梳理了凯恩斯关于概率与证据权重的区分，并分析这一区分如何影响其流动性偏好理论，进而评估了托宾、戴维森和马科夫斯基对凯恩斯不确定性-流动性偏好关系的不同表述。
In his economic writings, Keynes hints that his liquidity preference analysis is informed by the notion of evidential weight that first appears in his earlier Treatise on Probability. This paper reviews Keynes's distinction between probability and evidential weight, and offers an account of its influence in his later work on the incentive to hold liquid assets. Alternative representations of the Keynesian uncertainty/liquidity preference relation are assessed in the light of this discussion: James Tobin's mean-variance approach, the Keynesian fundamentalist view of Paul Davidson, and the flexibility approach represented by Louis Makowski. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.