What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play
提出一个模型，解释为何在协调博弈中拍卖参与权能促使参与者收敛到高效均衡，而直接博弈则陷入低效均衡，揭示了战略不确定性如何与历史依赖的学习动态相互作用。
A model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game, with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group. Subjects bid the market-clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged to that equilibrium, although subjects playing the game without auctions converged to inefficient equilibria. The efficiency-enhancing effect of auctions is reminiscent of forward induction but is not explained by equilibrium refinements. The model explains it by showing how strategic uncertainty interacts with history-dependent learning dynamics to determine equilibrium selection.