Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring
针对不完全私人监测的重复博弈，提出弱无信念均衡概念，它比现有文献中的无信念均衡更广泛且更易处理，并能实现更优的均衡结果。
Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The existing literature has identified a relatively tractable subset of equilibria. The present paper introduces the notion of weakly belief-free equilibria for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This is a tractable class which subsumes, as a special case, a major part of the existing literature (the belief-free equilibria). It is shown that this class can outperform the equilibria identified by the previous work.