Checklists and Worker Behavior: A Field Experiment
通过汽车修理厂的实地实验发现，提供检查清单并监控使用使收入提高20%，效果相当于增加1.6个百分点的佣金；检查清单既作为记忆辅助也作为监控技术，但工人不会主动使用，存在道德风险。
We analyze data from a field experiment in which an auto repair firm provided checklists to mechanics and monitored their use. Revenue was 20 percent higher during the experiment, and the effect is equivalent to that of a 1.6 percentage point (10 percent) commission increase. Checklists appear to boost productivity by serving both as a memory aid and a monitoring technology. Despite the large benefits to the firm, mechanics did not use checklists without the firm directly monitoring their use. We show that a moral hazard can explain why mechanics do not otherwise adopt checklists.