Internal Capital Markets and Corporate Politics in a Banking Group
研究了一个大型零售银行集团内部资本配置数据，发现总部通过资本配置补偿成员银行的存款短缺，提供存款平滑；更有影响力的银行获得更多资金，其贷款增长对存款基础更不敏感。
We analyze proprietary internal capital allocation data from a large retail banking group consisting of member banks and a headquarters organization. We find that capital allocations from headquarters compensate for deposit shortfalls on the bank level, suggesting that the headquarters offers deposit smoothing to member banks. We then analyze how the distribution of influence within the group relates to capital allocations and lending behavior. More influential banks are allocated more funds from headquarters, and their loan growth is less sensitive to their deposit base. The effects of influence are stronger if banks have a greater demand for deposit smoothing. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.