Social Networks, Employee Selection, and Labor Market Outcomes
通过实证检验Montgomery（1991）的理论，发现企业通过现有员工的社会网络招聘时，能吸引到在难以观察的维度上能力更强的工人，且现有员工的能力会影响新员工的入职、能力和工资。
We provide a direct empirical test of Montgomery’s 1991 notion that firms hire workers through social ties of productive employees as these workers know others with high unobserved productivity. We focus on coworker networks and show that firms recruit workers with better military draft test scores but shorter schooling when hiring previous colleagues of current employees, suggesting that firms use these networks to attract workers with better qualities in hard-to-observe dimensions. Incumbent workers’ abilities predict the incidence, abilities, and wages of linked entrants. These results suggest that firms rely on the ability density of the studied networks when setting entry wages.