Corporatism, profit squeeze and investment
从政治经济学视角论证法团主义制度通过解决分配冲突和稳定投资来促进宏观经济稳定，对19个OECD经济体的分析表明，法团主义强的经济体在1970-80年代成功避免了利润挤压，且投资更稳定。
This paper argues that the mainstream literature on corporatism focuses too narrowly on the relationship between corporatism and the labor market. It adopts a broader political economy perspective to argue that corporatist arrangements impart macroeconomic stability through the resolution of distributional conflict and through greater investment stability. Results for nineteen OECD economies are presented that demonstrate that economies with strong corporatist institutions have enjoyed much greater success in forestalling the profit squeeze of the 1970s and early 1980s. Further results also demonstrate that investment in such economies is more stable and resilient to movements in profitability. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.