Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
研究了不依赖选民相互了解的稳健投票规则，发现占优策略投票规则在全域上只能是随机独裁，但通过允许选民行为依赖信念，可在所有信念下实现帕累托改进，且结果适用于中间期望效用而非事后期望效用。
Abstract. We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters’ knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters ’ behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such assumption. However, on full domains, the only dominant strategy voting rules are random dictatorships. We show that the designer of a voting rule can achieve Pareto improvements over random dictatorship by choosing rules in which voters ’ behavior can depend on their beliefs. The Pareto improvement is achieved for all possible beliefs. The mechanism that we use to demonstrate this result is simple and intuitive, and the Pareto improvement result extends to all equilibria of the mechanism that satisfy a mild refinement. We also show that the result only holds for voters’ interim expected utilities, not for their ex post expected utilities. 1.