LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
研究了世界贸易组织的关税约束和行政保护如何影响立法机构制定的最惠国关税税率，发现关税约束使低关税更不可能，而行政保护则相反。
Tariff bindings and administered protection are two characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are little understood. Tariff bindings place a ceiling on tariffs that is not always reached, whereas administered protection provides all industries with some minimum import protection, effectively creating a floor for protection. How do these policies affect applied most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates that are enacted through the legislature? I model tariffs determined by a dynamic legislative process and show that low applied MFN tariffs are less likely with tariff bindings and more likely with administered protection than under purely legislated protection.